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Abstract 
Three texts were prepared for delivery at the first honorary doctorate awarded 
simultaneously by three Lisbon universities on 27 February, 2012: an introduction, a 
lecture and a comment. The event included the award of member of the Lisbon Academy 
of Science (ACL) by Manuel Jacinto Nunes, dean of the economics and finance section 
of ACL who proposed his name and Olivier Blanchard’s on the 30th anniversary of James 
Tobin receiving an honorary doctorate from Nova University.  
On 24 February , Paul Krugman visited ACL and participated in a session of the project 
dubbed “Letter to the lusofonia Queen”. Since this project is promoted by Nova SBE’s 
Center for Globalization and Governance and has been featured in some of the graduate 
courses, a short note on the meeting is included in annex. 
On 15 June, the three universities authorized an edition in Portuguese and donated the 
copyrights to a student award on “Krugman economics”, in a way still to be determined 
by the editor. The lecture and the comment will be translated as soon as a suitable 
publisher is found. Since a lot of the teaching at Nova SBE is in English, it seemed 
appropriate to reproduce the original texts in the order in which they were presented. A 
lively question and answer period was also recorded by Nova TV and should be made 
available in the book, together with highlights of the media coverage. 
 
Introduced as a “militant economist”, he speaks about a crisis “his mind loves but does 
not let the heart forget the poor and the unemployed”. The Nobel prize winner described 
as a“progressist pessimist of the world economy” concludes with a severe indictment of 
the profession. “In normal times, when things are going pretty well, the world can 
function reasonably well without professional economic advice. It’s in times of crisis, 
when practical experience suddenly proves useless and events are beyond anyone’s 
normal experience, that we need professors with their models to light the path forward. 
And when the moment came, we failed”.  
The comment, by the official responsible for Paul Krugman’s mission to Portugal in 
1976, contains an equally dire prediction: “I would very much like to see in the near 
future the weakening of the influence not only of freshwater economists but also of their 
conservative European followers. But I fear that this will not happen until we find 
ourselves in a more calamitous situation than at present”. Fortunately Silva Lopes closes 
in the hope “that the ideas of Paul Krugman will soon have more influence in policy 
makers than at present seems to be the case”. 
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ECONOMISTA MILITANTE 
Jorge Braga de Macedo 
 
Não tenho como agradecer a confiança que os três magníficos me expressaram na reitoria 
da técnica há três semanas. Em seu nome apresento o economista militante, pessimista 
progressista, investigador eficiente que gosta de literatura e ciência ficção, herdeiro tanto 
de Paul Samuelson como de George Orwell e Isaac Azimov, comandante que não puxa 
pelos galões, grande teórico de baixa estatura, barbudo que nunca é barbant nem 
barboso, cozinheiro gourmet que se veste como um alfarrabista, jornalista encorajado a ir 
para o Tesouro na canção de rock nº 77 (“we need you on the frontline, not just writing 
for The New York Times”)! 
 
Mais. Na última entrevista antes de chegar a Portugal é apresentado assim: “ele está no 
seu elemento porque adora uma boa crise. A economia global dá-lhe uma grande tela 
para desenhar uma imagem depressiva, mas ele também agita para acção que a seu ver 
nos pode tirar da bagunça em que estamos metidos”. Imperturbável, esclarece no seu 
blogue “Consciência de um Liberal” que foi entrevistado pela revista Playboy mas nem 
por isso usa “um agrafe no umbigo”.  
 
São tantos os contrastes e as matizes deste americano intensamente privado que - qual 
José Régio apaixonado – não consigo “dizer sem falsidade coisa que ditas já não são 
verdade”. Fingindo a mesma licença poética, declaro já múltiplas pertenças: formei-me 
na clássica mas, logo após regressar da revolução angolana, entrei na nova pela mão de 
Alfredo de Sousa, ele próprio recém-saído da técnica. Conheci o laureado no Grémio 
Literário quando entrevistei “os cinco do MIT” para a revista Nação e Defesa. Não me 
fardei para a refeição mas adverti na introdução (nº 2, p. 176): “dificilmente se pode 
criticar o notável trabalho desenvolvido, referindo – como alguns têm feito – que se trata 
de ‘estudantes’”. Identifiquei-os por ordem alfabética Andy Abel, Miguel Beleza, Jeff 
Frankel e Ray Hill. 
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Apresento aqui o quinto em três secções, porventura alusivas às partes interessadas ISEG, 
Nova SBE e esta casa. 
 
Supressão incestuosa da desvalorização cambial 
 
Terminava apresentando “Paul Krugman, formado em Economia na Universidade de 
Yale, que publicou um artigo sobre efeitos deflacionistas da desvalorização cambial no 
Journal of International Economics e teve importantes intervenções” na Conferência 
sobre a Economia Portuguesa, realizada na Fundação Gulbenkian em Outubro de 1976.   
 
Na altura em que o ex - Centro de Sociologia Militar começou a editar Nação e Defesa 
ainda se ouviam ecos da conferência proferida por Serge Kolm, na qual o radical propôs 
“uma desvalorização para salvar a revolução” e os capitães de Abril retorquiram ao 
Professor “no nosso país não se desvaloriza!”.  
 
Trinta anos depois, a convite de Silva Lopes, que idealizara as missões económicas do 
MIT, Krugman voltou à Gulbenkian com outros velhos combatentes. Num anfiteatro 
quase deserto enunciou a tese da “supressão incestuosa”, segundo a qual o “pensamento 
de grupo” impõe tal conformidade que ninguém se atreve a contestá-lo para não ser 
excluído desse mesmo grupo.  
 
Ouvir os militares que derrubaram o Estado Novo a amplificar o apego à moeda estável 
(mesmo que não convertível) do seu criador estica certamente o conceito de grupo. 
Porém, os trabalhos de outro Nobel em Economia de Princeton, Daniel Kahneman 
(Thinking, fast and slow, 2011) confirmam experimentalmente a tese da supressão 
incestuosa: somos rápidos e superficiais ou lentos e esforçados. O ditado “depressa e bem 
há pouco quem” revela o optimismo do nosso povo. Para os Nobel de Princeton, não há 
quem! 
 
A regra WYSIATI (o que se vê é tudo o que há, “Não queriam mais informação para não 
estragar a história”, p.88) ajuda a perceber o “esticão do euro” na economia portuguesa. 
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Cunhei o termo em 1998 para sugerir como o bom aluno da integração europeia foi 
vítima da sua má constituição fiscal. Num trabalho que escrevemos em Yale em 1978 
sobre as consequências económicas do 25 abril, apontamos para o papel dos salários no 
ajustamento conseguido pela desvalorização real do escudo. O artigo, injustamente 
esquecido, abria com citações comparando os ensinamentos das crises financeira com os 
de experiências laboratoriais, lembrando que tanto se pode diminuir o défice de 
pagamentos pela via dolorosa do corte no salário nominal como pela anestesia da 
desvalorização. Sabemos que o ajustamento foi interrompido por choques internos e 
externos obrigando a novo acordo com o FMI, ele próprio interrompido pelo fascínio da 
assinatura do tratado de Roma. Esse o padrão que levou ao esticão.  
 
Certo é que o papel da taxa de câmbio real no ajustamento externo tem dividido os 
economistas desde o debate há quase cem anos entre Maynard Keynes e Bertil Ohlin e 
era um tema aceso de conversa entre Carlos Diaz, Pentti Kouri e Paul Krugman nas 
elegantes vivendas da Hillhouse Avenue que acolhiam o Departamento de Economia. Na 
Fundação Cowles, James Tobin mantinha-se alheio porque -como tantas vezes me disse: 
M é moeda não consigo pensar em M denotar importações, por isso fecho a economia ao 
comércio internacional – como Keynes tinha feito na Teoria Geral! 
 
Os efeitos da desvalorização cambial no produto e no emprego são determinantes no 
debate pois que, para Keynes, não basta baixar o nível da despesa para eliminar o défice 
comercial, há que depreciar a moeda nacional em termos reais, ou seja sem que a inflação 
doméstica anule a desvalorização cambial. Numa conferência organizada pelo Banco de 
Portugal em Seteais nos finais de 1991, o laureado enunciou as suas famosas “lições de 
Massachusetts para a União Económica e Monetária”. Na linha do veterano de Princeton, 
Peter Kenen, Krugman considerou a solidariedade orçamental mais relevante para definir 
uma zona monetária óptima do que a mobilidade do trabalho ou do capital. Por isso na 
Zona Euro o desequilíbrio externo continua a ser relevante e até se torna mais perigoso na 
ausência do sinal de alarme do mercado cambial, que anuncia a desvalorização e realiza a 
expectativa dela.  
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Tal como Diaz, Kouri, Tobin ou Kenen, Krugman não podia estar mais longe do discurso 
de posse pronunciado em 23 de Fevereiro de 2000 no Salão Nobre do Ministério das 
Finanças: “Ninguém analisa a dimensão macro da balança externa do Mississipi ou de 
qualquer outra região de uma grande união monetária (…) A ressaca após um forte 
endividamento pode ter consequências recessivas, mas não é um problema 
macroeconómico de balança de pagamentos”.  
 
Certamente, com um défice de 5% em 2011, a nossa balança corrente melhorou de quatro 
em vez de dois pontos de PIB relativamente a 2010, com exportações a dois dígitos muito 
mais dinâmicas do que nos ajustamentos com desvalorização cambial. Mas não me falem 
no Mississipi a não ser para evocar o sonho de Martin Luther King! 
 
História contra Expectativas ou Oceano contra Lagos 
Além do seu premonitório livro de 1990, A idade das expectativas diminuídas (que iria 
desembocar no famoso Vendilhões da prosperidade) e da série “The Dismal Scientist” 
(coligida em The accidental theorist), tenho-me inspirado no artigo do Quarterly Journal 
of Economics “História contra Expectativas” e partilhado essa inspiração nas aulas. 
Vejamos aqui, na magna: se as pessoas se adaptam lentamente e descontam fortemente o 
futuro, se as economias externas são diminutas, a história torna-se decisiva e expectativas 
positivas não conseguem romper um equilíbrio de estagnação. Os custos de transacção 
que restringem as forças de concorrência específicas à tecnologia sugerem assim 
múltiplos equilíbrios na economia nacional ou mundial. Dependendo das condições 
iniciais, da dinâmica e das condições terminais, um processo de ajustamento pode levar a 
um «alto» ou «baixo» desenvolvimento, determinado pela história - do passado ou, com 
vénia para o padre António Vieira, do futuro. 
 
Além das instituições, do conhecimento e da tecnologia, o grau de paciência colectiva 
torna-se um parâmetro crucial do cálculo da relevância de eventos futuros. A paciência 
aplica-se tanto aos comportamentos de poupança individual ou colectiva como às 
instituições de cooperação inter-temporais, de que é um bom exemplo o acordo que hoje 
liga mais de 80% dos nosso deputados. 
6 
 
Pelo meu lado, assinei o tratado de Maastricht acreditando que a supervisão multilateral 
realizada pela Comissão Europeia ou pelo Fundo Monetário Internacional promoveria a 
emulação das melhores práticas - o tal equilíbrio institucional «alto» - em vez do contágio 
das piores práticas - o equilíbrio institucional «baixo». Não perdi a esperança na primeira 
solução mas a experiência mostrou que crises las hay - nacionais, regionais e mundiais! 
 
Mesmo quem argumenta que existe uma instabilidade inata na moderação, financeira, 
política e até intelectual, como Krugman, reconhece que a minimizou. Assim chegamos 
ao tema do dia: economia na crise. 
 
Bob Hall, lendário professor do MIT que migrou para a costa oeste, descreveu num 
trabalho inédito de 1976 a diferença entre economistas de água salgada que entendem que 
o governo pode gerir a crise causada pelos espíritos animais dos investidores ao passo 
que os de água doce atribuem a crise ao próprio governo! 
 
Nas aulas de introdução à economia usamos o manual de Krugman e sua mulher Robin 
Wells,  que tem nome, ao contrário de Mary Marshall, autora fantasma dos Príncipios 
que tornaram clássico o seu marido Alfred e que aqui saúdo. 
 
Água doce austríaca de Friedrich Hayek contra água salgada de Keynes, esse um tema 
favorito de exame, até pela memória do dueto musical entre ambos na vizinhança do Fed, 
clip com muito som e mais liquidez:  
 
We've been goin' back n forth for a century 
 [Keynes] I want to steer markets, 
 [Hayek] I want them set free 
There's a boom and bust cycle and good reason to fear it 
 [Hayek] Blame low interest rates. 
 [Keynes] No it's the animal spirits 
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Processo 
 
Por fim, um apontamento sobre o processo que nos trouxe a esta magnífica aula. Há 
quase três anos, a secção de economia e finanças da Academia das Ciências de Lisboa 
começou a ter reuniões regulares convocadas pelo decano Jacinto Nunes. Espicaçada pela 
crise financeira e pela visita da rainha Isabel à LSE, pretendeu substituir a vaga deixada 
aberta pela morte de Tobin. Recolhida uma vintena de candidaturas dos sócios, Krugman 
foi o mais votado mas a secção propôs também Olivier Blanchard e ambos foram 
ratificados em 2010 no plenário de efectivos da classe. 
 
Sem demora os novos sócios aceitaram a eleição e começámos a preparar uma 
conferência em colaboração com uma jornalista anónima (e exclusiva!). Na verdade, os 
efeitos da crise financeira global na percepção pública dos economistas haviam sido 
objecto de uma carta à rainha enviada pela Academia Britânica. Introduzindo as ciências 
naturais e os países do Sul (nomeadamente CPLP) concebemos uma “raínha lusófona” à 
qual queremos enviar uma carta. O Banco de Portugal, o Instituto de Investigação 
Científica Tropical e outras instituições foram postas ao corrente do projecto, que devia 
marcar o 30º aniversário da eleição de Tobin em Abril de 2011 (plano A). 
 
A deterioração do ambiente português e europeu aconselhou a adoptar o plano B, debates 
regulares aproveitando as viagens de uns e de outros e módulos nos cursos de mestrado 
da Nova SBE. Assim economistas como Renato Flores, da Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 
físicos como os confrades Vilela Mendes da técnica e Jean Pierre Contzen, da Academia 
Real da Bélgica, biólogos como o confrade Rui Malhó da clássica, aqui presente, 
professores de gestão como Joe Santos, do MIT Sloan foram trocando impressões, tendo 
Krugman participado no debate de sexta feira passada na presença de Jacinto Nunes e 
Silva Lopes, os dois outros ex-ministros das finanças aqui presentes, de Paulo Pitta e 
Cunha, mestre e  amigo que infelizmente não pode estar aqui hoje, e de António Pinto 
Barbosa, um dos incontornáveis gémeos económicos da nova, meus colegas, meus 
amigos, meus irmãos.  
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Dos três economistas da Academia a quem coube dirigir o Ministério das Finanças, 
aquele que não passou pelo Banco de Portugal pode agradecer o acolhimento 
institucional desde que o doutorando Krugman aterrou no gabinete da Avenida da 
República. Faço-o na pessoa do governador aqui presente, Carlos Costa. 
 
Em todo este processo contei ainda com o apoio fraterno de José Luís Cardoso, formado 
na técnica onde ensinou longos anos até migrar para a clássica. Ele fará a primeira 
pergunta após o comentário. 
 
Ouçamos o economista militante falar da economia na crise – que sua razão adora sem 
deixar o coração esquecer os pobres e desempregados. Pessimista progressista da 
economia mundial! 
 
9 
ECONOMICS IN THE CRISIS 
Paul Krugman 
To say the obvious: we’re now in the fourth year of a truly nightmarish economic crisis. I 
like to think that I was more prepared than most for the possibility that such a thing might 
happen; developments in Asia in the late 1990s badly shook my faith in the widely 
accepted proposition that events like those of the 1930s could never happen again. But 
even pessimists like me, even those who realized that the age of bank runs and liquidity 
traps was not yet over, failed to realize how bad a crisis was waiting to happen – and how 
grossly inadequate the policy response would be when it did happen. 
 
And the inadequacy of policy is something that should bother economists greatly – 
indeed, it should make them ashamed of their profession, which is certainly how I feel. 
For times of crisis are when economists are most needed. If they cannot get their advice 
accepted in the clinch – or, worse yet, if they have no useful advice to offer – the whole 
enterprise of economic scholarship has failed in its most essential duty. 
 
And that is, of course, what has just happened. 
 
In what follows I will talk first about the general role of economics in times of crisis. 
Then I’ll turn to the specifics of the role economics should have been playing these past 
few years, and the reasons why it has for the most part not played this role. At the end I’ll 
talk about what might make things better the next time around. 
 
Crises and useful economics 
 
Let me start with a paradox: times of economic disturbance and disorder, of crisis and 
chaos, are times when economic analysis is especially likely to be wrong. Yet such times 
are also when economics is most useful. 
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Why the paradox? Well, first of all, consider what economics can contribute in calm 
times. 
 
The answer, I’d submit, is surprisingly little. OK, economists can explain why the system 
works the way it does, and offer useful advice about reforms that would make it better; 
there’s always use for good microeconomics. 
 
But if you’re trying to make predictions, economists won’t have much to contribute. Take 
the case of exchange rates, one of my original home areas of research. In ordinary times, 
it’s very, very hard for structural models to beat a random walk – that is, models based on 
an attempt to track the forces moving the exchange rate, such as changes in prices and 
changes in monetary policy, are barely if at all better than the simple guess that 
tomorrow’s exchange rate will be the same as today’s. And it’s even harder to beat an 
experienced trader, who has been through many fluctuations and has developed both 
useful rules of thumb about price patterns and a strong intuitive sense of what comes 
next. 
 
Economic modelers may be better placed to engage in policy analysis. But even here, 
experienced practical hands may have the better advice to offer; they know from 
experience what will soothe the markets, what will rile them, and as long as events 
remain within the range of their experience, this informal understanding may trump the 
inevitably simplified and stylized analysis of those who know the world through 
equations and diagrams. 
 
But now let there be a severe disruption that pushes the economy into terrain experienced 
practical men have never seen – say, an environment in which credit markets collapse, or 
short-term interest rates on assets considered safe are pushed all the way to zero. Because 
there are large and normally unforeseen disruptions, the sheer unpredictability of events 
will mean many bad economic forecasts, so if you ask how nearly right economists are in 
their ability to predict events, they will seem to be doing very badly compared with 
calmer times. But the question you should ask is how economists are doing compared 
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with those who use other ways to understand the world, and in particular how they are 
doing compared with sober, serious, experienced men in suits. And it is precisely in 
disturbed times that economists can and sometimes do offer dramatically better 
predictions and policy judgments than what we normally consider wise men. 
 
Take, for example, the relationship between deficits and interest rates. It’s not an example 
chosen at random, of course; I believe that it gets to the heart both of the nature of the 
crisis we’re in and the terrible failure of economists – plus, not incidentally, it happens to 
be something I personally got right. More about that shortly. But for now, let’s just focus 
on what we should have known. 
 
Most practical men, confronted with the prospect of unprecedented deficits in the United 
States, the UK, and elsewhere, extrapolated from their usual experience, in which 
increased borrowing drives up interest rates. And so there were widespread predictions of 
sharp rate rises. Most famously, perhaps, Morgan Stanley predicted in late 2009 that 
interest rates on 10-year US bonds, then around 3.5 percent, would shoot up to 5.5 
percent in 2010; in early 2011 Pimco’s legendary head, Bill Gross – who had correctly 
predicted low rates in 2010,predicted a rate spike by the summer. And in each case these 
views were very widely held. 
 
But economists who knew basic macroeconomic theory – specifically, the IS-LM model, 
which was John Hicks’s interpretation of John Maynard Keynes, and at least used to be in 
the toolkit of every practicing macroeconomist – had a very different take. By late 2008 
the United States and other advanced nations were up against the zero lower bound; that 
is, central banks had cut rates as far as they could, yet their economies remained deeply 
depressed. And under those conditions it was straightforward to see that deficit spending 
would not, in fact, raise rates, as long as the spending wasn’t enough to bring the 
economy back near full employment. It wasn’t that economists had a lot of experience 
with such situations (although Japan had been in a similar position since the mid-1990s). 
It was, rather, that economists had special tools, in the form of models, that allowed them 
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to make useful analyses and predictions even in conditions very far from normal 
experience. 
 
And those who knew IS-LM and used it – those who understood what a liquidity trap 
means – got it right, while those with lots of real-world experience were wrong. Morgan 
Stanley eventually apologized to its investors, as rates not only stayed low but dropped; 
so, later, did Gross. As I speak, deficits remain near historic highs – and interest rates 
remain near historic lows. 
 
Crises, then, are times when economics and economists can and should really prove their 
worth. And I’d like to say that some of my friends and colleagues did; maybe some of 
them will say that I did OK, too. But one can’t say that of the profession as a whole. On 
the contrary, all too many of us had rejected the very kinds of analysis that were to prove 
so useful. And more than that, all too many actively opposed the policy measures the 
crisis called for.  
 
Actually, let me talk a bit more about the failures of the economics profession in this 
crisis. 
 
What should economists have known? 
 
The most common accusation against economists in this crisis is that they failed because 
they didn’t see it coming. Even the Queen of England has demanded that economists 
explain their failure to predict the crisis. But I would actually defend my colleagues 
against assertions that this predictive lapse was, in and of itself, all that much of a failure.  
 
To take the most absurd case, nobody could realistically have demanded that the 
economics profession predict that Lehman Brothers would go down on September 15, 
2008, and take much of the world economy with it. In fact, it’s not reasonable to criticize 
economists for failing to get the year of the crisis right, or any of the specifics of how it 
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played out, all of which probably depended on detailed contingencies and just plain 
accident. 
 
What you can criticize economists for – and indeed, what I sometimes berate myself for – 
is failing even to see that something like this crisis was a fairly likely event. In retrospect, 
it shouldn’t have been hard to notice the rise of shadow banking, banking that is carried 
out by non-depository institutions such as investment banks financing themselves through 
repo. And it shouldn’t have been hard to realize that an institution using overnight 
borrowing to invest in longer-term and somewhat illiquid assets was inherently 
vulnerable to something functionally equivalent to a classic bank run – and, furthermore, 
that the institutions doing this were neither backed by deposit insurance nor effectively 
regulated. Economists, of all people, should have been on guard for the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness, should have realized that not everything that functions like a 
bank and creates bank-type systemic risks looks like a traditional bank, a big marble 
building with rows of tellers. 
 
And I plead guilty to falling into that fallacy. I was vaguely aware of the existence of a 
growing sector of financial institutions that didn’t look like conventional banks, and 
weren’t regulated like conventional banks, but engaged in bank-like activities. Yet I gave 
no thought to the systemic risks. 
 
Even more broadly, economists should have been aware of the dangers of leverage. This 
was hardly a new concern. Back in 1933 – yes, 1933 -- Irving Fisher published his classic 
paper on debt deflation, that is, on the way high levels of debt create the possibility of a 
self-reinforcing downward spiral. And the paper remains astonishingly relevant; aside 
from a few archaisms of style it could have been written from today’s headlines. So 
remembering Fisher all by itself should have been enough to rouse at least a few worries 
as household debt rose dramatically relative to income, not just in America, but in a 
number of European nations too. 
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Again, I plead guilty to negligence. I had especially little excuse for being oblivious to 
these dangers given that I had actually laid great stress on balance-sheet factors in 
causing financial crises in emerging market. True, those crises had a lot to do with 
currency mismatch – basically, private debt in other countries’ currencies, so that a 
speculative attack on a currency could quickly translate into a crippling collapse of 
domestic demand. But I and others should have seen that this was only one possible 
channel for balance-sheet crises, that plunges in housing prices or for that matter income 
could have the same effect. 
 
So economists fell down on the job by not seeing what were in retrospect clear warning 
signs that the kind of crisis that struck in 2008 was both possible and becoming 
increasingly likely. 
 
Yet I would submit that these predictive failures were venial sins compared with the 
much more important failure to speak with anything like a unified voice on how to 
respond to the crisis when it came. 
 
Depression economics and how it was lost 
 
Suppose that something like the crisis of 2008 had struck, say, 40 years ago. At that 
point, I believe, there would have been widespread agreement on the part of economists 
about what to do. Everyone in the profession knew IS-LM analysis; everyone understood 
the case for expansionary monetary policy to fight recessions when it was available, and 
at least understood the argument that there are times when conventional monetary policy 
is not available and fiscal policy may be the best tool at hand. 
 
By the time the crisis actually did strike, however, all too many of my colleagues had 
either rejected or forgotten the analysis they needed. And as a result there was a 
cacophony of voices when we needed a chorus, intellectual fog at the very moment when 
we desperately needed clarity of vision. 
 
15 
How did that happen? There was, of course, a deep divide within macroeconomics about 
the right kind of model, and I believe that one side of that divide got it very wrong (and I 
am, of course, right in that view!). But that is the sort of thing that happens in any field, 
and the principle that I personally am always right isn’t a good basis for intellectual 
inquiry. What was wrong, instead, were three consequences of that intellectual divide that 
reflect very badly on the profession. First, one side of the divide became intellectually 
insular in a way that proved disastrous in the crisis. Second, much of the profession 
reacted to the dispute by running away from the whole issue of slumps and what to do 
about them, again crippling the response to crisis. Finally, even the “right” side of the 
divide – that is, my side – let itself be bullied into a style of analysis that was inherently 
biased against any kind of readiness for crisis. 
 
Macroeconomics: What went wrong? 
 
I assume that most of those hearing or reading this speech at all closely are aware of the 
great divide that emerged in macroeconomics in the 1970s. For those who aren’t familiar 
with the story: in the 1930s Keynesian economics emerged as a response to depression, 
and by the 1950s it had come to dominate the field. There was, however, an undercurrent 
of dissatisfaction with that style of modeling, not so much because it fell short 
empirically as because it seemed intellectually incomplete. In “normal” economics we 
assume that prices rise or fall to match supply with demand. In Keynesian 
macroeconomics, however, one simply assumes that wages and perhaps prices too don’t 
fall in the face of high unemployment, or at least fall only slowly.  
 
Why make this assumption? Well, because it’s what we see in reality – as confirmed once 
again by the experience of peripheral European countries, Portugal included, where wage 
declines have so far been modest even in the face of very high unemployment. But that’s 
an unsatisfying answer, and it was only natural that economists would try to find some 
deeper explanation. 
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The trouble is that finding that deeper explanation is hard. Keynes offered some plausible 
speculations that were as much sociological and psychological as purely economic – 
which is not to say that there’s anything wrong with invoking such factors. Modern “New 
Keynesians” have come up with stories in terms of the cost of changing prices, the desire 
of many firms to attract quality workers by paying a premium, and more. But one has to 
admit that it’s all pretty ad hoc; it’s more a matter of offering excuses, or if you prefer, 
possible rationales, for an empirical observation that we probably wouldn’t have 
predicted if we didn’t know it was there.  
 
This, understandably, wasn’t satisfying to many economists. So there developed an 
alternative school of thought, which basically argued that the apparent “stickiness” of 
wages and prices in the face of unemployment was an optical illusion. Initially the story 
ran in terms of imperfect information; later it became a story about “real” shocks, in 
which unemployment was actually voluntary; that the real business cycle approach. 
 
And so we got the division of macroeconomics. On one side there was “saltwater” 
economics – people, who in America tended to be in coastal universities, who continued 
to view Keynes as broadly right, even though they couldn’t offer a rigorous justification 
for some of their assumptions. On the other side was “freshwater” – people who tended to 
be in inland US universities, and who went for logically complete models even if they 
seemed very much at odds with lived experience. 
 
Obviously I don’t believe any of the freshwater stories, and indeed find them wildly 
implausible. But economists will have different ideas, and it’s OK if some of them are 
ones I or others dislike. 
 
What’s not OK is what actually happened, which is that freshwater economics became a 
kind of cult, ignoring and ridiculing any ideas that didn’t fit its paradigm. This started 
very early; by 1980 Robert Lucas, one of the founders of the school, wrote approvingly 
of how people would giggle and whisper when facing a Keynesian. What’s remarkable 
about that is that this was all based on the presumption that freshwater logic would 
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provide a plausible, workable alternative to Keynes – a presumption that was not borne 
out by anything that had happened in the 1970s. And in fact it never happened: over time, 
freshwater economics kept failing the test of empirical validity, and responded by 
downgrading the importance of evidence. 
 
This was, by the way, not a symmetric story: saltwater economists continued to read 
Lucas and his successors. So only one side of the divide shut itself off from opposing 
views. 
 
And this inward turning had what can now be seen as a fateful consequence: freshwater 
macro, basically something like half or more the macroeconomics field, stopped teaching 
not only new Keynesian research but the past as well. And what that meant was that 
when crisis struck, we had half a generation of economists who not only had no model 
that could make sense of the crisis, but who blithely reproduced classic errors of the past. 
Keynes spent a good part of his magnum opus, The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest, and Money, refuting Say’s Law – the proposition that income must be spent, so 
that shortfalls of demand are impossible, and government spending in particular cannot 
add to demand. Yet in 2008 and 2009 we had well-known professors from Chicago and 
elsewhere opposing stimulus because ... income must be spent, so government spending 
cannot increase demand. Intellectually, much of the profession had unknowingly 
regressed 75 years. 
 
Worse yet, the consequences were not limited to the acolytes of freshwater economics. 
Quite a few economists responded to the bitter warfare between schools of thought by 
running away from business cycle issues in general. I know whereof I speak: when Robin 
Wells and I began writing our principles of economics textbook, the general view was 
that you should focus on long-run growth, and relegate things like recessions and 
recoveries to a brief section at the end. Why? Because focusing on the long run was safer, 
less likely to get the committees that choose textbooks riled up. 
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The problem, of course, is exactly the one Keynes himself diagnosed in his most famous 
quote: 
 
“But this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. 
Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can 
only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again.” 
 
Finally, all was not well even in saltwater economics. 
 
Even though saltwater economists had too much reality sense to accept the notion that 
unemployment is an illusion and recessions are voluntary, indeed optimal, they were not 
immune to the push for more rigor and more math. You might say that they suffered from 
rigor envy. And so New Keynesian models tried to have as few deviations from perfect 
markets as possible, and tried to embed their analysis in a framework where everyone 
knew what was going on and behaved optimally except for a few ad hoc constraints. The 
result was DSGE – dynamic stochastic general equilibrium – models, which looked a lot 
like real business cycle models, except for the assumed wage/price stickiness. 
 
So what’s wrong with that? Well, DSGE models have three aspects that make them 
unsuited to times like these. First, they’re unwieldy; you can’t easily sketch out your 
argument on a piece of paper, and you can’t easily translate it into ordinary language to 
explain it to a politician. Second, they normally assume that the data we see come from a 
regular process of random shocks, with strong incentives for the modeler to assume that 
the shocks are more or less normal, not involving large, low probability events – which 
leaves you unready for the Big One when it happens. Finally, the desire to make the 
things tractable tends to favor linearity, or at least models that can be done in terms of 
linear approximations; again, that’s not a modeling style that leaves you ready to deal 
with sudden financial crisis, which may involve multiple equilibria and at the very least 
involves regime change in which the effects of a given policy or shock may suddenly 
become quite different. 
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What we really needed, I’d submit, was a large number of economists ready and willing 
to go for good first approximations – quick and dirty but intellectually sophisticated 
approaches that would let them respond to a radically changed economic environment. 
Good old-fashioned IS-LM fits the bill, and as I see it the economists who did best in this 
crisis began with IS-LM, then backed it up later with simplified versions of New 
Keynesian analysis. But knowledge of IS-LM has become surprisingly rare, and comfort 
with it – appreciation of its virtues as well as its vices, and understanding of just how 
sophisticated it really is in some ways – has become even rarer. 
 
And this has had terrible consequences. 
 
From analysis (or lack thereof) to policy 
 
In the years after 1980, and even more so, the years after 2000, the foundations for crisis 
were laid. The banking system became, de facto, largely unregulated and unsecured. 
Leverage rose, both fueling and fueled by housing bubbles (and, in Europe, the false 
confidence fostered by the creation of the euro). The conditions for disaster became ever 
better; and the disaster came. 
 
Now what? The answer should have been simple, and backed by an overwhelming 
consensus. The immediate problem was a huge shortfall of demand, as the private sector 
moved from large financial deficit to large financial surplus. To avoid terrible effects on 
output and employment – effects that would only magnify the problems of excess 
leverage – we needed not just a rescue of the financial system but also strong government 
action to support demand while the wreckage was cleared.  
 
What kind of action? There was and is a case for large-scale unconventional monetary 
policy, which in a zero-bound economy has to work largely through inflation 
expectations. But the more proximate tool, with the greatest known effectiveness, was 
fiscal policy, especially increased government purchases of goods and services. 
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Anyone who knew the IS-LM model understood that. But too much of the economic 
profession had lost the hard-won understanding of earlier generations. So instead of a 
common call for action, we got acrimonious argument, with quite a few economists 
essentially acting as spoilers, undermining the credibility of those trying to get 
governments to do the right thing. And as I said, to a remarkable extent the “learned” 
arguments against government action were actually repeating fallacies like Say’s Law 
and the Treasury View that had been thoroughly refuted in the 1930s. 
 
Should we be surprised, then, that economic policy makers, after responding fairly 
effectively to the banking crisis, proceeded to lose the thread? 
 
What happened, in fact, was that to a large extent policy makers ended up going for 
economic doctrines that made them feel comfortable, that corresponded to the prejudices 
of men not versed in economics. 
Thus, it’s normal to think of the economy as a whole as being like a family, which must 
tighten its belt in hard times; it’s also completely wrong. But lacking any clear message 
from the economists about how and why this is wrong, it became the common standard of 
discussion in America, where both Republicans and, alas, President Obama became very 
fond of the statement that the government should tighten its belt because families were 
tightening theirs. 
 
It’s also normal to think of economics as a morality play, a tale of sin and redemption, in 
which countries must suffer for their past excesses. Again, this normal reaction is wrong, 
or at least mostly wrong –mass unemployment does nothing to help pay off debt. But 
absent clear guidance from the people who are supposed to explain that economics is not, 
in fact, a morality play, moralizing became the core of economic policy thinking in 
Germany, and hence played a huge role in European policy more generally. 
 
Finally, government officials who hang out with businessmen – and almost all of them do 
– naturally tend to be attracted to views that put business confidence at the heart of the 
economic problem. Sure enough, belief that one should slash spending even in a 
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depressed economy, and that this would actually promote growth because it would have 
positive effects on confidence, spread like wildfire in 2010. There were some economic 
studies used to justify the doctrine of expansionary austerity – studies that quickly 
collapsed under scrutiny. But really, the studies became popular because they suited the 
prejudices of politicians, prejudices that would have been totally familiar to Herbert 
Hoover or Heinrich Brüning. 
 
And so our response to the crisis has been utterly inadequate. 
 
The failure of economics 
 
The best you can say about economic policy in this slump is that we have for the most 
part avoided a full repeat of the Great Depression. I say “for the most part” because we 
actually are seeing a Depression-level slump in Greece, and very bad slumps elsewhere in 
the European periphery. Still, the overall downturn hasn’t been a full 1930s replay. But 
all of that, I think, can be attributed to the financial rescue of 2008-2009 and automatic 
stabilizers. Deliberate policy to offset the crash in private spending has been largely 
absent. 
 
And I blame economists, who were incoherent in our hour of need. Far from contributing 
useful guidance, many members of my profession threw up dust, fostered confusion, and 
actually degraded the quality of the discussion. And this mattered. The political scientist 
Henry Farrell has carefully studied policy responses in the crisis, and has found that the 
near-consensus of economists that the banks must be rescued, and the semi-consensus in 
favor of stimulus in the initial months (mainly because the freshwater economists were 
caught by surprise, and took time to mobilize) was crucial in driving initial policy. The 
profession’s descent into uninformed quarreling undid all that, and left us where we are 
today. 
 
And this is a terrible thing for those who want to think of economics as useful. This kind 
of situation is what we’re here for. In normal times, when things are going pretty well, 
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the world can function reasonably well without professional economic advice. It’s in 
times of crisis, when practical experience suddenly proves useless and events are beyond 
anyone’s normal experience, that we need professors with their models to light the path 
forward. And when the moment came, we failed. 
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COMMENTS ON PAUL KRUGMAN’S PRESENTATION 
 
Jose Silva Lopes 
 
It is a great honor for me to comment on the presentation that Paul Krugman has just 
delivered to us. But this is also an intimidating challenge. How can I, with all my 
limitations, comment the ideas of one of the most brilliant and influential economists of 
the world today? 
 
This is not the first time that I find myself in such a difficult situation. I faced similar 
problems when I met Paul Krugman for the first time, in 1976.  At that time he was only 
23 years old and he was still a PhD student in MIT. But I soon concluded that, in spite of 
the differences in our ages, in our institutional positions and in our familiarity with 
Portuguese economic problems, he was far better than me in analyzing those problems 
and in making proposals for their solution.  
 
The presentation that he has delivered to us today is an excellent example of the 
relevance and quality of his work in dealing with the most important real world issues, 
instead of being directed, like that of many others, to theories, based on unrealistic 
assumptions and faulty models. 
 
I believe that economic theories are closely influenced by the ideological preferences of 
those that originate them or agree with them.  In my view, the starting assumptions of the 
theories of those that Paul Krugman classifies as freshwater economists are chosen not 
for their realism and relevance but with two other objectives. The first is to show, under 
the veil of scientific reasoning, that most of the State interventions in the economy are 
ineffectual or produce negative economic results, and that consequently market 
mechanisms must be free of government interferences. The second objective is to build 
models based on assumptions that make it possible to use of sophisticated mathematical 
method that bring academic prestige, even if they do not contribute at all to useful 
interpretations of real world economic phenomena and actual economic behavior.  
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The freshwater economists can of course accuse the saltwater ones, in the opposite camp 
of the economic debate, of similar ideological bias. But I am of the opinion that there is a 
big difference between the two: the later ones are more committed to realism, while the 
former persist in their fanciful hypotheses, even after the facts of the real world, and in 
particular the crises of 2008-2009, show clearly how wrong they have been.  
 
My worries about the present state of economic theories come more from their impact on 
economic policy makers than from their intrinsical validity. In the beginning of the 
present economic crisis in industrialized countries, Governments and Central Banks 
reacted by adopting expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. During an initial period, 
many of us believed that Keynesianism had returned. But that period turned out to be 
very short.  
By 2010, most governments, and to a smaller extent some Central Banks, were back to 
conservative policies of demand restrictions, dominated much more by the objective of 
avoiding inflation than by that of stimulating the recovery. 
I refrain from commenting the debates in the United States, about which Paul Krugman 
has written so much. But I cannot hide my alarm about what is being done in the Europe. 
We are all aware that macro-economic policies in Euro area countries are to a large 
extent dictated by Germany. The leading German economists and policy makers are 
strongly influenced by the freshwater thinking in the USA. But to that influence they add 
their own reasons for adopting policies of demand restriction.  
The first of these reasons is their obsession with inflation, which is even stronger than 
that of the conservatives in the United States. Because of that obsession, they tend to 
oppose any fiscal and monetary policies that might involve risks, however slight, of 
pushing inflation above very low levels. The second reason is the moralist belief that 
fiscal sins have to be punished by fiscal expiation, i.e. by austerity, whatever its economic 
and social consequences may be.  
 
I am of the opinion that countries like Portugal, Greece and Ireland can not escape severe 
restrictive fiscal policies, given the excessive weight of their foreign and public debts and 
their unsustainable external disequilibria.  
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But, within the constraints of the European Monetary Union, the adjustments in those 
countries would be less painful if two conditions were met.  
The first relates to the amount of external assistance provided by countries with large 
current account surpluses. If Portugal received more assistance, although with appropriate 
conditionality, the contraction of its economy would be less deep, because there would be 
more time to wait for the results of the improved competitiveness that structural measures 
are expected to produce. Those who propose harsh fiscal austerity argue that it will bring 
back the trust of private economic agents, and will therefore encourage them to invest 
more and consume more. However, the experience of the last two years has proved 
abundantly that this argument is a fallacy. The rating agencies downgrade the debt of 
countries with large fiscal and external disequilibria. But when these disequilibria begin 
to be corrected by austerity policies which depress growth, they downgrade it again, this 
time because the expected improvement of confidence does not materialize and economic 
growth turns out to be unsatisfactory.  
The second - and more important - of the conditions that I mentioned above, is that the 
solution of the difficulties in indebted countries should require more expansionary 
domestic demand policies in those which have external surpluses.  
The international payments system should recover the arguments of Keynes, in the 
Bretton Woods negotiations, in favor of symmetric adjustments not only in countries with 
deficits but also in those which have surpluses. Unfortunately such a change does not 
appear to be likely in the near future, despite the existing dangerous problem of big 
payments disequilibria on a world scale. 
Germany should reduce its large current account surplus- which in recent years has 
fluctuated between 5 and 6 percent of GDP – by stimulating its domestic demand and 
thus increasing the exports of other Euro area countries.  
But what we are seeing is that, in spite of brilliant performance of its exports, the rate of 
increase German domestic demand is projected to fall from an estimated 2,5% in 2011 to 
around 1,5% in 2012.  
The fiscal policy is a major contributor to this containment of domestic demand. 
According to recent forecasts of the European Commission, the cyclically adjusted public 
deficit in Germany is projected to fall from 1.3% of GDP in 2011, to 0.7% in 2012 and to 
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0.4% in 1913. And Germany has not only introduced in its constitution the principle of 
practically forbidding fiscal deficits in the future, but also has led other Euro area 
countries to accept the a similar rule, imposed by the Intergovernmental Treaty, which 
was signed two weeks ago. 
The policies advocated by distinguished German economists and by the German 
Authorities might result in the elimination of deficits, both external and fiscal, in the 
more indebted countries of the Euro area, but at the cost of economic and social disasters. 
The surplus in Germany would end up by being also cut, since its exports would be 
negatively affected. But the new equilibrium would be reached at income levels which 
would be significantly lower across Europe than those which would achievable with more 
expansionary macro-economic policies. 
 
I would very much like to see in the near future the weakening of the influence not only 
of freshwater economists but also of their conservative European followers. But I fear 
that this will not happen until we find ourselves in a more calamitous situation than at 
present.   
My only hope that the ideas of Paul Krugman will soon have more influence in policy 
makers than at present seems to be the case. 
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Annex “The lusofonia Queen”        
Academia de Ciências de Lisboa 
 24th February 2012 
 
On 24th February 2012 the economics and finance section of ACL met to debate a paper 
delivered by Rui Malhó, entitled “A Cell Biologist naive approach: notes on my 
contribution to “A letter to the lusofonia Queen””. The meeting was attended by 
Professors Jacinto Nunes, Paulo Pitta e Cunha, Jorge Braga de Macedo, who chaired the 
meeting, José Silva Lopes, António Pinto Barbosa, Rui Vilela Mendes, Rui Malhó, Paul 
Krugman, Helena Garrido. Doctors Ana Melo and Luís Goulão, biologists from the 
Tropical Research Institute wrote this note..  
 
The “together alone” paradox depicted in the question of Queen Elizabeth to the LSE on 
November 2008, was tackled from a biological approach to trigger amultidisciplinary 
debate on the global financial crisis. 
 
RM: Biological systems rely on intricate interactions between their players, both at the 
internal level and their relations with the exterior. Whatever decision is taken, it implies 
enormous risks that may lead to error, which in the vast majority of cases, are dissipated 
by the system’s properties. Conversely, in human societies, the huge pressure that 
politicians do not error, leadsto a lot of subsequent errors.  
Why did people not see the crisis arriving? 
The regulators were too close to the problem to see it. There was cognitive bias and 
people chose to disregard the high probability that things could go wrong. In addition, the 
perception of what one thinks is good for him, may not be the really best for him. 
Parallels between biological and society systems are hampered by moral constraints. 
Solidarity and altruism, which are absent from biological systems, are highly valued in 
societies, while parasitism and commensalism, driving forces for nature evolution, are 
morally indefensible.  
Biological systems do not include bad consciousness, making networking their natural 
rule. Moving away from equilibrium disturbs the system, forcing it to adjust to a new 
condition. 
Societies have less networking than nature. A possible regulation mechanism is to force 
information networking. However if regulation is too strong it will limit evolution and 
with sharing of information, assets will be lost.  
Dealing with the crises, biological and society systems present similarities in their 
behavior. In both cases, alternative available resources will be thrived to satisfy the 
needs,even if they require more input. In the Portuguese case, an obvious alternative 
could be to emphasize connections with CPLP. 
 
RVM introduced the coupling question, suggesting that problem is not the crisis itself, 
but the coupling between finances and interest rates, emphasizing the importance of the 
timing of intervention from the regulators. 
 
PK mentioned evolutionary economics.  
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Organisms’ evolution occurs locally and takes place over time, maximizing reproductive 
success, often taking advantages from crises in detriment of equilibria. 
If economics is done with the right spirit, some biological models cannot be applied. 
Some aspects in economics can be modeled by physics.  
The Queen’s question is a wrong question. Financial crises are not new, they happen all 
the time and are recognizable. This time is different, but it is never different. At the 
surface it looks different, but on the basis there is always the same pattern.  
In spite this time, more documentation is available from the past, people have a short 
memory regarding crises. In the immediate times people will save, but then they will 
forget and so will the regulators.People’s perception of bank functions hasbeen 
misjudged. Lots of banks and products were unsupervised and unguaranteed. 
 
PC questioned parallels between the biological world and the “human world”, pointed 
Greece as a natural catastrophe and raised the question of whether there would be a 
biological model to solve the crisis. Information networking was suggested as an advance 
in society. 
 
SL: Behavioral economics is a growing field from which we have more to learn than 
from biology. Sociology and history can give more support to understand and apply to 
crises. Different organisms; different behaviors.The way to solve a crisis in Germany can 
hardly be successfully applied to Portugal, due to personality differences. 
 
APB asked PK if he would agree that there was some original misdiagnosis about the 
most relevant fragilities that of the Euro Zone. If so, might have this possibly contributed 
to a somewhat inadequate design of a proper monetary framework? (written question 
below) 
 
LG valued the contribution of psychology, psychiatry and neurology to understand the 
crisis, framingbiology of thinking-organisms. Fear prevented us from seeing the crisis 
and difficulties in facing errors lead to more errors.Different geo-political references 
induce different information perceptions.Likewise, distinctaveragelife expectancy thrive 
different decisions and will to take risks. 
 
AM: There are two levels of regulation in a cell - locally and globally. There is also an 
enormous redundancy of regulation mechanisms to overcome cell malfunctioning. 
Moreover, the efficiency of biological regulation relies on huge networking between 
every pathway of the system. Only this ensures life as a tightly regulated and thus 
successful process. 
 
RM: We have to find accurately our place in the system.There is a difference between 
individual and collective behavior.Time scale is critical when applying biological models 
to behavioral ones.Man has social sciences,nature does not. 
 
HG questioned how to relate biological models to finance markets. Nowadays economy 
is not the same as a couple of years ago. Can we apply the same models?  
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BM: We have two minds - a shallow and a slow and lazy. Since the 2nd is lazy we tend to 
use too much of the 1st,what limits rationality. It’s easier to see the balances on others 
than in ourselves. 
 
PK: This crisis was an asymmetric shock story.Europe is pretty close to a closed system. 
 
 
“No economic theory can perform the feats its users have come to expect of it. (…) Too 
much of what happens in an economy depends on what people expect to 
happen.”Through multiple perspectives, sights, networking and capacity of transmission 
between groups, a new attitude to face and overcome crises arises. The diversity of CPLP 
perspectives could contribute to put multidisciplinarywork in the agenda and to trigger 
public debate by academies and research universities. “Portuguese-speaking economists 
might transcend the silo curse in a world that is both highly connected and tribal” (Gillian 
Tett, FT). 
 
Question to Professor Krugman, raised by Prof. Antonio Pinto Barbosa: 
 
By the time of the creation of the Eurozone (EZ), the most important risk feared was a so-
called asymmetric shock, 
illustrated by a fall in demand  in  some specific  member of the union. Conventional 
thinking emphasized the importance of labor mobility to the subsequent  adjustment and,  
given  the low  labor mobility in the EZ , the  asymmetric shock could set off a protracted 
recession in that country. 
 
Now, after more than a decade since the launching of the euro,  the big threat seems to 
come  from another direction:   not so much from an  asymmetric demand shock but, 
instead, 1) from  a sort of Minsky moment upon  accumulated debts  of some member 
states like Portugal and 2) from  the impossibility  of the afflicted sovereign state to step 
into the domestic bond market to cap interest rates, via its Central Bank intervention,  
when  investors are massively pulling  out of it.  This seems  to be, in some sense,   the 
opposite of what the conventional analysis predicted:  the big threat  came not from 
insufficient demand caused by some asymmetric shock, but from persistent  excess 
demand above production,  an excess  translated   into a significant  accumulation of 
external debt. 
 
Question: Would you agree that  there was some original misdiagnosis   about  the most 
relevant fragilities that of  the EZ ? If so, might   have this possibly  contributed  to  a 
somewhat inadequate design of a proper monetary framework? 
 
